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Abstract
Significant concerns exist over the ability of the healthcare and public health systems to meet
the surge demands that would result from an event such as an influenza pandemic. Current guid-
ance for public health planners is largely based on expert opinion and may lack connection to
the problems of street-level public health practice. To identify the problems of local planners and
prepare a state-level planning template for increasing health care surge capacity that accounted for
these issues, a study was conducted of local pandemic planning efforts in thirteen counties, finding
that cognitive biases, coordination problems, institutional structures in the healthcare system, and
resource shortfalls are significant barriers to preparing and implementing a surge capacity plan. In
addition, local planners identify patient demand management through triage and education efforts
as a viable means of ensuring adequate capacity, in contrast to guidance proposing an increased
supply of care as a primary tool.
KEYWORDS: pandemic influenza, hospital surge capacity, emergency planning, public health
preparedness, cognitive biases
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Introduction 
 
Concerns over the threat of bioterrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and the 
potential for an influenza pandemic are bringing attention to the functional 
capacity of the healthcare system. The ability of hospitals to manage increased 
demand for patient care in an epidemic has been questioned. Since the recent 
emergence of novel avian influenza strains, preparedness for a new pandemic has 
been an issue of primary concern.(Homeland Security Council 2005) 
Annually, influenza results in up to 36,000 deaths in the United States. 
Influenza viruses experience rapid evolution of primary surface antigens, resulting 
in periodic pandemics caused by the emergence of novel strains that are more 
infectious and/or pathogenic than normal. In the best known case, the 1918-1919 
Spanish Flu pandemic, it is estimated that over a third of the world population 
was infected, with an estimated 675,000 deaths in the United States 
alone.(Taubenberger and Morens 2006) Two milder pandemics and three 
additional pandemic scares have occurred since.(Kilbourne 2006) The recent 
emergence of novel avian strains of Type A influenza have raised concerns over 
the threat of a new pandemic.(Webster et al. 2006) Current CDC estimates place 
the impact of a new pandemic on the United States as 89,000-207,000 deaths, 
314,000-734,000 hospitalizations, up to 47 million illnesses, and an economic 
effect of as much as $166.5 billion, excluding any secondary effects from 
economic disruption.(Meltzer, Cox, and Fukuda 1999)  Uncertainty exists 
regarding current capabilities to forecast a pandemic event, meaning that planners 
operate in the “fog of epidemics.”(Krause 2006) The potential impact of a 
pandemic is large enough that preparation for the threat is a priority.(Benjamin 
2004; Palese 2004; Trampuz et al. 2004; Earls and Hearne 2004; Oxford 2005) 
 
Building Surge Capacity 
 
A surge event as one in which the demand for medical services is large enough to 
require health care facility operations in an environment where resource 
constraints force the replacement of ideal care standards with care meeting the 
patient’s immediate but not ideal needs. Such surges occur both as transitory 
“daily surge” events or as a more significant sustained surge.(Bonnett et al. 2007) 
Daily surge issues are related to economic incentives to keep emergency 
department staffing levels at a level of maximum efficiency rather than maximum 
demand, while catastrophic surges arise due to extraordinary events beyond 
normal maximum demand and involve broader areas of health care than the 
emergency department.(Kelen and McCarthy 2006) 
By the late 1990s, surges during routine flu seasons began to tax the 
ability of hospitals to provide patient care.(Richards et al. 2000; Derlet, Richards, 
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and Kravitz 2001) The Community Tracking Study project found in 2006 that the 
standby capacity of hospitals to deal with emergencies was lacking.(Katz, Saiti, 
and McKenzie 2006) Likewise, studies of Kentucky hospitals(Higgins et al. 2004) 
and nationwide(Crosse et al. 2003) found significant gaps in the ability of 
hospitals to meet the demands of a public health emergency. Capacity shortfalls 
have been noted in emergency departments, intensive care beds, and general 
medical/surgical beds.(Bazzoll et al. 2003) Likewise, significant infrastructure 
issues exist that pose barriers to safe management of patients with highly 
communicable respiratory infections.(Srinivasan et al. 2004) Workforce 
shortages, pressures from the payer community, and regulatory burdens aggravate 
the problem of creating hospital capacity to deal with unusual demands.(Bentley 
2001; Kaji, Koenig, and Lewis 2007) 
In the United States, the Health Resources and Services Agency  (HRSA) 
established benchmarks for regional surge capacity in terms of the number of 
patients that would require treatment under various scenarios, but these standards  
may not reflect the relationship between resources and capacity and were 
formulated through methods which are not transparent to the scientific 
community.(Schultz and Koenig 2006) For influenza, current planning scenarios 
from the US Department of Health and Human Services anticipate that a flu 
pandemic would involve a minimum of 839,000 additional hospitalizations and an 
increase of at least 25% in demand for ICU beds and ventilators. Guidance 
suggests planning for such a surge in hospital demand by examining staffing 
issues, bed capacity, and the stockpiling of eight weeks of consumable supplies. 
Planners are urged to plan for care in non-hospital settings such as outpatient 
clinics and temporary hospital facilities.(Department of Health and Human 
Services 2005) While identifying the complex and wide-ranging measures 
necessary to meet surge needs for influenza, neither the plan nor federal budget 
provides assistance or guidance for how to meet these goals.(Levi, Inglesby, and 
Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 2001)  Similar guidance 
documents for augmentation of care in epidemic events are available from other 
sources.(Rubeinson et al. 2005; American College of Physicians 2006) 
Beyond physical capacity, events such as Hurricane Katrina exposed 
deficiencies in the ability of both public and private agencies to coordinate 
planning and responses to disaster situations.(Tierney 2007) When response 
requires coordination of agencies with differing priorities, planning is crucial in 
establishing common ground rules and decision criteria.(Allison 1969) Networks 
with poorly delineated or ambiguously understood communications patterns are 
likely to fail under the stress of an emergency, making this a critical issue.(Choi 
and Kim 2007) 
One issue increasingly recognized as important is the idea of system 
resilience, or creating systems able to adapt to unanticipated contingencies. 
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Despite large funding increases for preparedness activities since 1998, 
coordination efforts and emergency planning are hampered by conflicting 
incentives, issue definition problems, and lack of leadership, limiting the ability of 
the healthcare and public health systems to respond and adapt to large scale 
emergencies.(Avery 2006) Local and regional coordination gaps are of particular 
concern in the United States due to a federalistal system and the role of healthcare 
providers as independent, competing organizations.(Bartlett 2006) Current efforts 
at emergency preparedness and management coordination, such as the use of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) are hampered by planning 
mechanisms that dodge tough questions of leadership, collaboration, and 
authority; excessive and unrealistic efforts to centralize decision making; and 
failure to involve the entire network in planning.(Lester and Krecji 2007) Recent 
national surveys have found that emergency planning and coordination between 
hospitals and other emergency partners is not robust and leaves room for 
improvement.(Braun et al. 2004; Braun et al. 2006) As an example, the response 
to a pertussis outbreak in Arkansas in 2001-2002 was hampered by a lack of 
cooperation between providers and public health personnel.(Wheeler et al. 2004)  
To date, most work on pandemic preparedness has focused on a top-down 
approach, using questionnaires based on expert views to assess needs rather than 
evaluating preparedness based on needs as viewed from the hospital and local 
health department/emergency planning level. Generally, this has focused on the 
presence of certain physical capabilities, without examining the ability of 
healthcare and public health systems to implement or adapt plans in the event of a 
need for the capability. For example, the National Center for Health Statistics 
conducted a preparedness study that focused primarily on items such as the 
number of beds and ventilators, items identified as useful for a specific 
emergency – a terrorist attack with biological weapons.(Niska and Burt 2005) An 
exception is found in “Providing Mass Medical Care With Scarce Resources: A 
Community Planning Guide,” a publication of the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) that offers guidance on coordination and planning 
issues.(Roberts et al. 2006) Our study addresses that gap and complements the 
work of AHRQ by presenting empirical findings based on lessons learned by local 
planners as part of the process of preparing local health systems to manage a 




Between November 2006 and August 2007, a team of specialists in public health, 
nursing, and engineering carried out a project to develop a planning template for 
surge capacity in the event of an influenza pandemic, with an original focus on 
establishing alternative sites for the provision of inpatient care. This project was 
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initiated in response to findings from a 2006 study of Indiana county health 
departments indicating that significant widespread deficiencies existed in the area 
of surge capacity development. As a part of this project, a series of structured and 
unstructured interviews, both via phone and on-site visit, were conducted with 
representatives of the public health, emergency preparedness, and hospital sectors 
in eleven Indiana counties representing diverse geographical and demographic 
backgrounds, and with differing healthcare and public health environments. 
(Figure 1) The interview questionnaires were pre-tested in two additional counties 
















Figure 1. Counties Interviewed Regarding Pandemic Preparedness Planning 
Efforts 
Grey Counties – Instrument validation 
Black Counties – Primary Study Group  
 
Multidisciplinary teams including both faculty and graduate students from 
multiple departments in Engineering, Public Health, and Nursing were assigned to 
each county, with a graduate student delegated to coordinate efforts and collate 
collected data. Initial interviews were conducted by a faculty or post-doctoral 
investigator to train the student teams, and findings were discussed and analyzed 
in group meetings coordinated by faculty investigators. Reports on the project 
findings were prepared for each county and shared with the county Health 
Coordinator, who had the opportunity to provide feedback and clarification. 
Common themes and significant issues were identified for use in the preparation 
of the final project report.  
 
 




Several basic themes were widely observed. First, the perception of the impact of 
a pandemic is so strongly shaped by the worst case scenario that it has an adverse 
impact on planning efforts. Second, planning and coordination problems are 
widely identified as barriers to preparedness, and are being addressed with mixed 
results. Third, concerns exist over the ability of local jurisdictions and hospitals to 
adequately staff healthcare efforts in a pandemic. Fourth, logistical and financial 
concerns are reported in many counties. Fifth, county planning efforts reveal that 
counties are attempting to address these problems with surge capacity through 
efforts aimed at reducing the demand for hospital care rather than increasing the 
supply of care available. Finally, identified problems indicate that county plans 
must take into account the fact that an influenza pandemic will not occur in 
isolation, and the healthcare system will have to continue to deal with other 




In several counties, the perception of the pandemic impact can be characterized as 
a synthesis of misinformation, resulting in a perception of impact which exceeds 
the worst cases historically observed. Several counties, for example, cited impact 
assessments of >50% attack rates and a case fatality rate of 50%. These beliefs 
were strong enough in some cases to result in rejection by planners of estimates 
from the CDC software packages FluSurge and FluAid.(FluSurge 2005; Crosby 
1999) It was determined that these beliefs were derived from linkage between the 
case fatality rates of the low attack rate/high case fatality rate of H5N1 influenza 
strains with the infectivity of the 1918 strains. This is aggravated by federal 
communication efforts that confuse the two. For example, the federal Department 
of Health and Human Services created a communications website that is accessed 
by both the www.pandemicflu.gov and www.avianflu.gov URLs, implying that 
the two situations are identical.(Department of Health and Human Services) This 
confusion resulted in a sense of helplessness among some planning teams, 
resulting from a belief that any planning would be rendered useless by to the 
magnitude of the problem. This indicates a need for more care in risk 
communication by federal, state, international, and academic public health 
experts. 
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Problem Definition 
• Strategic communications from CDC 
and state agencies overstate the 
dangers and leads to a perception of 
helplessness 
 
Planning and Coordination Issues 
• Lack of clear role definitions and statutory 
authority 
• Coordination complicated by inter-system 
hospital rivalries 
• Planning boundaries are political and do not 
match hospital markets 
• Focus is largely on planning jurisdiction 
 
Staffing Issues 
• Lack of guidance on credentialing 
medical reserve list members 
• Lack of guidance on malpractice 
insurance/indemnity for medical 
reserves 
• Non-hospital medical personnel are 
needed for outpatient facilities 
• Loss of workforce is anticipated due to 
illness from the pandemic 
 
Logistics 
• Supply shortages are anticipated due to 
widespread nature of a pandemic 
• Planners look to external authorities to 
alleviate these shortages 
• Pressures for cost containment limit the 
hospital’s ability to stockpile 
• Costs may force hospitals to reduce 
operations or close 
• Insurance contracts reimburse only for 
treatment at the hospital’s physical address, 
limiting options for offsite augmentation 
• The pandemic is not the only problem- must 
maintain other critical services such as 
emergency and chronic disease care 
Demand Management 
• The best strategy appears to be to 
reduce demand, not increase supply 
• Focusing on developing triage 
strategies and augmenting outpatient 
care 
• Strategic communications plans are 
critical and need to be implemented 
across the media market 
• Prepare the public for reduced 





Table 1.  Key Findings 
 
Planning and Coordination Issues 
 
Planning and coordination efforts are hampered by two issues. First, there is a 
lack of clarification of the roles of local public health, emergency management, 
and healthcare officials. In some jurisdictions, this is further hampered by lack of 
support from one or more of these parties. Second, planning jurisdictions are 
6 JHSEM: Vol. 5 [2008], No. 1, Article 29
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol5/iss1/29
delineated by political boundaries which bear little resemblance to the geography 
of local health care markets, resulting in a mismatch between the way resources 
are used and the plans formulated for using them to meet the demands of a 
pandemic. 
 Role clarification difficulties appear to be driven primarily by local 
factors, aggravated by a lack of clear role definitions and statutory authority. The 
state Pandemic Influenza Plan (Monroe 2006) is vague on the roles and 
responsibilities of local health departments, which may be complicated by 
confusion with role delineation in other state and local emergency plans. County 
Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs) are generally delegated responsibility 
for local emergency management, while local health departments have 
responsibility for public health issues, and hospitals remain independent 
organizational actors, meaning that any coordination is dependent on the ability of 
local sector leaders to cooperate with each other and define roles on a local level. 
Where the environment is organizationally complex, coordination problems grow. 
One large urban county, for example, reports that the existence of multiple public 
health jurisdictions, multiple hospital systems, and nearly two dozen emergency 
medical service providers renders coordination between planning partners 
difficult, even with cooperative relationships.  
Rivalry between hospital systems was observed to have an adverse impact 
on coordination, although the study found that a mediator could reduce the 
barrier. One county reported difficulties in logistical cooperation due to hospitals 
operating to protect themselves by withholding inventory. Another mid-size 
county experienced issues arising from aggressive competition between two rival 
hospital systems. Fortunately, the presence of an outside third-party (the project 
team) served as a moderating influence in bringing the systems to the table and 
initiating discussions that concentrated on “big picture” planning for a pandemic 
event, which led to the formation of an interagency “Pan Flu Core Planning 
Group” including key members of the healthcare and public health communities 
for continuing coordination. The Emergency Preparedness Coordinator in a third 
county noted that, although they experienced no significant conflicts, meetings 
attended by the study group resulted in more productive discussion and greater 
willingness by participants to cooperate and execute ideas. This unanticipated side 
effect of the study provides evidence that the utilization of impartial parties to 
facilitate discussion can have a positive impact on coordination efforts.  
Problems also exist in less complex environments. One small county 
reports that, although the local EMA theoretically would take charge of managing 
a pandemic emergency, in practice the hospitals retain control and hence the 
feasibility of implementing the plan may be questionable. Resource constraints 
further hinder efforts in smaller counties. One small county reports that planning 
efforts are hindered by the absence of a permanent, full-time county emergency 
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management director coupled with lack of leadership from the local health officer. 
While county elected officials desire to be informed of plans, they do not actively 
participate in the planning process. The county leadership was described as taking 
“we’ll worry about it if it comes” view of their role. Some small counties lack not 
only public health leadership resources, but also have no hospital and no 
physicians to step in and assume an emergency leadership role. Because of 
resource scarcity, public health and emergency planners in some of these counties 
believe that they would not be required to respond, and could thus defer 
responsibilities to neighboring counties. 
Many planners exhibited unrealistically high expectations for external 
assistance, particularly in terms of material support from state organizations such 
as the National Guard and the Governor’s Office. County perceptions appear to be 
grounded in experience with localized disasters such as floods or tornados, 







Figure 2.  Differences Between Indiana County (Left) and Hospital Market 
Boundaries (Right). 
  Market Boundaries represent Health Service Areas from the Dartmouth Atlas of 
Health Care. 
 
Even if intracounty coordination issues were resolved, a problem remains 
in that hospital market boundaries do not coincide with political boundaries (state, 
state emergency planning district, or county) used for planning (Figure 2). 
Epidemic disease and similar hazards are noted for the property of spatial 
indeterminancy – occurring not “in a place, but in multiple places simultaneously, 
so that their spatial dimensions are often difficult to identify.” (Aguirre et al. 
2005) This complicates the problem of developing institutional resilience when 
emergency planning is focused on local issues and a point source perspective. 
Much of the Homeland Security and FEMA training material used by the counties 
focuses on single-point emergencies, thus bringing limited attention to the 
additional logistical challenges of multi-site responses that extend over a broad 
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spatial area and extended duration.(Levin, Gebbie, and Qureshi 2007; Davey 
2007; Gensheimer 2004) Preparedness resources distributed for bioterrorism 
planning, for example, have been criticized for undercutting broad, inter-
jurisdictional all-hazards planning.(Smithson and Levy 2000)  
Clear evidence of the special indeterminancy aspect of pandemic response 
coordination was observed in the problems faced by the study population. Three 
study counties, as well as one of the two validation counties, are at the core of 
health referral regions that cross into three states, and two other counties (a mid-
size suburban county and a small rural county) are part of referral regions with 
significant service providers in other states. All cited significant issues with 
planning and resource allocation. One of these noted, for example, that the other 
state was willing to coordinate how to transfer patients to Indiana hospitals, but 
was unwilling to provide resources to help support care for such patients.  
Similar issues were seen with cross-county coordination. In nearly every 
case, local government planners were focused on the population of their counties, 
with the assumption that resources in that county would be utilized only by that 
population.  In two cases a broader horizon was voiced, yet concrete action to 
coordinate planning across a market had yet to be undertaken. One large county 
simply worked from the assumption that they would be responsible for taking in 
out-of-county patients, yet had not taken steps to coordinate with surrounding 
jurisdictions. Another local health officer reported a rebuff of attempts to 
coordinate planning with other jurisdictions. Planners in smaller, outlying 
counties within secondary markets also failed to report efforts to initiate 
cooperation with counties at the core of the referral regions.  
While this problem was widespread among government planners, some 
interjurisdictional planning was reported within hospital systems with larger 
system hospitals supporting smaller outlying hospitals within the same health 
system. One system, for example, reported the ability to augment the staff 
resources at small community hospitals through a telemedicine system. 
Although coordination and cooperation are vital for robust planning, one 
disturbing trend was an underestimation of the requirements to implement a plan. 
In many cases, it was felt that simply identifying partners for a response was 
enough to ensure that the problem could be managed, an attitude that results in a 
lack of effort to identify potential problems and address them in advance of an 
emergency. 
All major partners expected to participate in a disaster response scenario 
as complex as a pandemic event should be involved in the initial planning phases 
for at least two major reasons. First, role expectations for all parties will be 
identified and modified if the expectations cannot be met. Second, effective 
coordination is often dependent on the development of relationships over time, a 
process that is difficult to accomplish during the execution of a disaster response. 
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Through initial involvement of more partners initially, gaps in expertise and 
function will be identified earlier, allowing time for adapting plans.(Gerber 2007; 
Glass 2001) The implementation of jointly developed plans will thus be smoother 
than if created in isolation because of the ability to develop and identify 




Nearly every county planning group identified issues with staffing as a significant 
problem. All interviewees worked from a common assumption that at minimum 
the same percentage of healthcare workers as the general population would be 
affected by the disease at a time when demand for care was increasing. Broad 
efforts were cited to implement guidance from the federal Pandemic Influenza 
Plan (Department of Health and Human Services 2005), but significant problems 
with the guidance suggestions were noted.  
Most counties had undertaken efforts to establish a “reserve” list of retired 
or inactive physicians and nurses, but cited a lack of state guidance on licensing 
and credentialing issues, and few had addressed the issue of malpractice insurance 
and indemnification. These issues were felt to be beyond the jurisdiction of the 
county-level planners. In addition, a widely cited theme was a lack of confidence 
that those on a “reserve” list would in fact be available in the event of a pandemic. 
A number of counties have looked at the use of non-hospital medical 
providers. One barrier to this is the realization that staff in facilities such as 
outpatient clinics may be more useful by reducing the demand for hospital 
services by providing care in an outpatient setting. Several counties were 
exploring arrangements to have outpatient practices pool resources and 
consolidate practice locations to more efficiently use outpatient care resources. 
Several counties with nursing schools operating within their borders have 
explored the idea of utilizing nursing students as care extenders, but the efficacy 
of this will depend in part on school decisions on how to respond to a pandemic 
event and whether to continue operations. In addition, while nursing schools have 
been approached, the study did not reveal whether any county has explored the 
willingness of students to agree to assist. One county has explored the idea of an 
out-of-hospital inpatient facility to provide minimal care using EMS personnel 
with periodic visits by a nurse or physician.  
The concerns voiced by the interviewed planners are not unique to 
Indiana, and have been noted elsewhere.(Wynia and Gostin 2004) Plans 
effectiveness should not depend on brittle assumptions regarding the availability 
or willingness of providers to respond to an emergency. As a result, realistic plans 
account for a reduction in the available healthcare workforce. 
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Logistical and Financial Barriers 
 
The fourth significant problem area identified by the study counties concerned the 
ability to manage the logistical issues associated with a surge in demand due to 
the pandemic, as well as managing the costs associated with the surge. Because a 
pandemic by definition involves a broad section of the population in a widespread 
geographical area, most planners assume that a relatively large percentage of the 
population will be infected, with resulting disruptions of supporting services, and 
that all similar jurisdictions will be likewise impacted, meaning that external 
assistance would be limited. As a result, the planners voiced the assumption that 
they will be operating in isolation and competing for scarce resources. This is 
probably an appropriate assumption, in contrast to planning for other public health 
emergencies, such as a bioterrorist attack or natural disaster such as Hurricane 
Katrina, where external help is likely to be available in the form of federal 
assistance or resource transfers from unaffected regions. At the same time, the 
planners continued to act in contradiction to this assumption by looking largely to 
external agencies such as the National Guard or the Governor’s office to solve the 
problem of resource shortages. 
The most significant problem area discussed concerned the possibility of 
replenishment of medical supplies. Nearly every county involved in the study 
cited this as a significant worry. Pharmaceuticals and personal protective 
equipment topped the list, although more prosaic issues such as food and laundry 
services were cited in a number of small counties. Pharmaceutical worries 
extended not simply to flu/pneumonia specific drugs such as antivirals or 
vaccines, but also to maintenance medications for chronic diseases. Two counties 
cited plans to have patients to bring their own maintenance medications if 
admitted to the hospital in order to ensure that their needs are met. At least one 
county was concerned that supplies of these medications would be reduced to the 
point where hospital demand would be increased as a result of lack of medications 
to manage chronic conditions. One factor cited as complicating the ability of 
hospitals to develop stockpiles for emergencies are economic pressures to run 
lean operations, which has led to adoption of a version of just in time ordering 
interpreted as minimizing inventory rather than managing the costs of inventory. 
On the other end of the pipeline, planners in one large county cited concerns over 
how to dispose of higher volumes of medical waste when the availability of waste 
disposal is uncertain during pandemic waves. 
Smaller counties are particularly constrained by a lack of bed space and 
equipment. One county lacked a hospital or even a physician practicing within the 
county. Those with critical access hospitals lack bed space and often other 
important resources, such as ventilators, respiratory isolation, or ICU beds. An 
example of this situation is seen in a county of approximately 27,000 that has 
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access to no ICU beds and only two ventilators, a level of resource availability 
barely adequate under the best case scenario modeled using the CDC FluSurge 
and FluAid tools. Furthermore, this county currently lacks the nursing staff to 
continuously support even one patient on a ventilator. Although some have 
attempted to develop infection control plans that separate flu patients from the 
general population, this is problematic in small hospitals that lack the physical 
space to obtain adequate separation. Space limitations are complicated by the 
competing demand to add bed space to meet increased demand. At the other end 
of the spectrum, a large metropolitan county with multiple multi-hospital systems 
and significant resources is developing a plan to dedicate an entire hospital to 
influenza patients.  
A commonly identified issue concerns the financial implications of a 
pandemic. One hospital noted that, under their estimates of increased demand, 
they would be forced to cease operations within 30-40 days. Others indicated that 
they would be dependent on federal or state disaster assistance funds for 
operational expenses, an assumption that may be unrealistic for an event that 
would involve much of the country. Few considered the fact that most patients 
would be insured and that they could use usual mechanisms to seek 
reimbursement for care which might provide a revenue stream. One small county 
hospital that did look at insurance reimbursement found that insurance 
reimbursement would only be made if care was provided at the hospital’s physical 
address. This logistical/legal specification limited options for expanding bed 
capacity based on ad hoc county needs. Others made the assumption that a 
widespread event would result in default by insurers due to bankruptcy from a 




Given the perceived barriers to increasing hospital capacity, most planners have 
opted to deal with hospital capacity issues at least in part through efforts to reduce 
demand for hospitalization. These efforts generally take the form of triage 
systems during the active pandemic period to ensure that hospital resources are 
utilized only by patients with the greatest medical need. Additional tools have 
been identified for development prior to the pandemic outbreak to reduce the 
intensity of the event, including public information efforts to convince those with 
the disease to utilize self-care when possible, creation of dedicated outpatient flu 
and fever clinics, and public education programs to prevent exposure by 
encouraging social distancing. 
Triage, by definition, focuses on identifying those cases that are most 
urgently in need of treatment and most likely to benefit. As healthcare resources 
become strained, providers are increasingly pressed to make decision regarding 
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the allocation of those resources. Developing a triage plan in advance overcomes 
a number of issues that may arise, providing a set of a priori criteria and 
procedures, reducing confusion and the need to force already pressed providers to 
make what may appear to be arbitrary decisions. One recent study, based on 
hospital capacity in northern Netherlands, suggests that the use of triage strategies 
based on strong indications and firm decision-rules can allow hospitals to 
maintain the capacity to serve most patients requiring intensive care.(Nap et al. 
2007) One positive sign observed in this study is that most counties have included 
this issue in discussions of how to respond to a pandemic event. One particular 
concern is separation of potentially infectious flu patients from uninfected patients 
with other health problems. As a result, plans were being discussed to segregate 
flu patients or move triage functions out of the hospital physical into facilities 
such as a tent clinic or neighboring school gym to control the risk of infection. 
Larger counties with multiple hospitals have adopted a variety of triage strategies, 
including centralized facilities and triage operated at each individual hospital by 
that hospital.  
Some counties have taken the first steps towards more sophisticated triage 
criteria by the development of a strategy to ensure that adequate outpatient care is 
available for less serious patients. Besides ensuring that outpatient care remains 
available, these strategies reduce the pressure for patients to seek hospital care. 
Specific strategies vary. One larger county at the center of a regional market 
worked with the multisite, multispecialty group practice employing the majority 
of local physicians to develop a plan for converting one of five clinic sites to a 
dedicated flu clinic. At the same time, the group plans to dedicate a second site to 
treatment for chronic disease patients at high risk for infection– chemotherapy, 
renal dialysis, etc – in order to reduce the probability of infection through 
exposure to the general patient population. Another small county was working on 
arranging for primary care practitioners to pool resources for dedicated clinics. A 
mid size county was developing plans to supplement outpatient providers with 
EMS personnel as extenders at off-site centers which would combine the triage 
function with a fever clinic. 
The key component to these strategies is a strong public education and 
communication plan. The key stakeholders in the event of a pandemic include not 
just planners or healthcare providers, but also the general public - the pool of 
potential patients in the event that a preparedness plan must be implemented. 
Almost every county had at least a basic communications plan in place to provide 
the public with information on the disease, educate the public as to how the local 
system was responding, and to explain emergency care procedures to manage 
public expectations and direct patients to the most appropriate source of care. A 
specific concern that was raised, however, was how to fund a media strategy.  
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Another potential problem identified was the discontinuity between 
service areas and planning geography – in this case, the structure of media 
markets. Many county planners focused only on media sources physically located 
in the county, rather than the sources actually used by their population. For 
example, one suburban county planned on disseminating information through the 
one radio station located in the county borders, a college radio station with a weak 
signal and limited transmission range, rather than the higher rated television and 
radio stations in the adjacent urban county. Where this issue was considered, 
concern was raised over the potential confusion arising from the same media 
presenting potentially conflicting messages from multiple counties.  
Consistency of message was emphasized by one large urban county which 
had recently experienced a strain of influenza which forced all local hospitals to 
diversion status. Within that county, efforts had been made to use that experience 
to develop a coordinated message. Likewise, another mid-sized county has 
focused on developing a common communications strategy for participants. 
Coordination between counties was, however, largely non-existent. As an 
example, one larger county had developed printed educational material and 
expressed a willingness to share it, but neither it nor its neighbors had initiated 
contact to make that a reality. 
Not all efforts focused on mass media. Many had initiated outreach efforts 
in the form of community speaking engagements by local government and 
hospital staff. Most planners were aware of special populations that might pose 
unusual problems in terms of communications, such as Old Order Amish 
communities that had little contact with electronic media or refugee/immigrant 
populations with language or cultural barriers. County governments, hospitals, 
and in some cases cooperative local businesses or educational institutions had 
begun efforts to prepare their workforce for issues relating to a pandemic via 
strategies such as educational flyers included with pay stubs. One county stood 
out by developing an educational DVD that contained messages from other 
jurisdictions, which was distributed both in and out of the originating county. 
In addition to preparing the population for altered standards of care and 
procedures for accessing care, counties we visited were concerned with using the 
educational efforts to try to prevent the spread of the disease, with the view that 
reducing infection rates would reduce the surge in demand for care. As a result, 
most included efforts to convince the population to practice some form of 
voluntary social distancing. In at least one county, with essentially no health care 
resources and weak public health leadership, the adoption of this strategy 
amounted to a symbolic effort resulting from a perception that they lacked the 
resources to develop a plan to deal with other issues related to a pandemic, yet 
needed to do something. Conversely, one mid-size county had given the problem 
sufficient attention as to identify the need to maintain in-home entertainment (for 
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example, television programming) as a key factor in encouraging voluntary 
distancing.  
The majority of counties considered an involuntary quarantine strategy 
unworkable, due to lack of resources to enforce quarantine orders, limited 
involvement by political and law enforcement leaders, and sometimes weak 
leadership from emergency management and public health agencies. In general, 
county-level planners seemed to overestimate public compliance with social 
distancing measures, and to underestimate the difficulties of implementing 
quarantine. Some counties indicated a belief that  the only necessary steps to 
assure universal effectiveness during an involuntary quarantine would be a 
request that individuals stay home. 
 
Pandemics Do Not Occur in Isolation 
 
A consistent message that was communicated to the research team was that 
emergency planning cannot assume that the pandemic emergency is the only 
demand on health care organizations. Essentially every county noted that the 
demand for other health care services would continue, and not all of these 
demands were for elective services that could be deferred. Hospitals were 
planning under the assumption that they would have to provide care for other 
pressing demands, such as trauma, medical emergencies, childbirth, and chronic 
illnesses. As one hospital planner noted, “people will still have heart attacks.” In 
addition, several county planners noted the possibility of a second, overlapping 
incident such as a blizzard or tornado required building additional resilience into 
pandemic plans. The existence of these needs means that not all beds can be 
allocated for flu, and thus planning requires attention to infection control to 
prevent transmission to other seriously ill and hospitalized non-influenza patients. 
Resources such as ventilators will require allocation between influenza and other 
medical and surgical patients. Although some larger counties with multiple 
hospital systems were able to consider dedicating hospitals to flu patients, the 
majority did not have that luxury due to the presence of a single hospital. Staffing 
augmentation efforts likewise need to account for this. It was noted in several 
cases that the use of EMS personnel as care extenders was limited by the need to 
maintain emergency response capabilities, which were already stretched to the 
point that a significant percentage of EMS responders worked multiple positions 
in the field. Likewise, the use of outpatient nursing and physician personnel was 
limited by a realization that reducing the availability of outpatient care was likely 
to drive more patients to seek hospital care. Almost all counties were giving 
consideration to altered standards of care to stretch resources, but were wary of 
this option due to liability concerns and lack of statutory protection from 
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The problems identified in this study, unfortunately, are typical of emergency 
preparedness planning. At the local level, disaster preparedness and planning is 
often hindered by local political and practical barriers, (Gerber 2007) and 
responses are conditioned by rumors, trust, existing social relationships, and turf 
issues.(Glass 2001) As Meyer argues, three cognitive biases have been widely 
found to weaken planning efforts for low probability/high consequence risks: an 
over reliance on short-term feedback, tendencies to extrapolate directly from the 
present to the future, and excessive discounting of future rewards compared to 
short-term costs.(Meyer 2006) All of these were observed in this study.  
Organizational learning was distorted by a misinterpretation of the risks 
arising from a pandemic situation as well as an over reliance on lessons from 
planning for bioterrorist and other point source incidents. Multiple messages 
regarding the H5N1 avian influenza strain, the history of the 1918 pandemic, and 
the use of the rhetoric of the worst case scenario resulted in many planners 
confusing the messages and assuming that any future pandemic would have 
consequences worse than any influenza epidemic recorded. Because some 
hospitals can manage the surge from a mild pandemic without extraordinary 
measures (Sobieraj et al. 2007), this perceptual bias hinders realistic and effective 
planning. Efforts by state and federal agencies to develop local response 
mechanisms to respond to emergencies resulted in institutional planning 
mechanisms that are focused on political boundaries and mechanisms that are 
divorced from the reality of the service areas of the actual primary responders – 
healthcare delivery organizations. Guidance from state and federal agencies, 
which form the basis of most response planning, largely treats response elements 
as discrete response elements, which resulted in barriers to recognizing the 
interconnection of efforts.  
Extrapolation of the present to the future was observed as well. For 
example, plans to use nursing students in several counties as care extenders 
assumed that nursing schools would continue operations, or that students would 
remain local and willing to participate in the response in a high risk environment. 
With few exceptions, planners failed to look beyond their borders, whether to 
identify resources to support their population or to identify additional demand for 
resources in their jurisdiction. Because planning responsibilities are defined by 
local political jurisdictions, most focused only on those jurisdictions, with efforts 
to initiate intercounty cooperation rarely noted. Although some changed premises 
were recognized, such as the need for altered standards of care, it was largely 
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assumed that the ramifications of these changes were beyond the scope of the 
local agencies, and would be dealt with by state authorities. Several counties 
made the assumption that state aid, from the state Department of Homeland 
Security or the National Guard, would be available at the same levels for a 
widespread pandemic, based on their experience that such aid was forthcoming 
for a localized problem. This assumption persisted despite guidance that such 
assistance was unlikely. 
The discounting issue was most evident in the areas of logistics. Once the 
assumption was made that the system would face a large increase in demand for 
care, the cost of providing care at the level of current standards dominated 
discussions of the hospital level response. Repeatedly, the cost of 
pharmaceuticals, supplies, and staffing were cited as barriers. At the same time, 
assumptions of how to cover the costs were notable in the failure to realize that 
many costs may be recovered through normal insurance billing processes and 
reductions in elective procedures and the use of triage mechanisms to reduce 
demand from less severe cases could result in reductions in extra demand for 
materials. How well the insurance system would cope was beyond the scope of 
this study, however, responses indicated that planners had not explored the issue. 
Although mechanisms for demand management such as communications 
strategies, use of outpatient care for less serious cases, and triage to assist in 
allocating care were widely included in plans, the impact of these on resource 
needs was not recognized in a corresponding manner. Much of the discounting 
problem may be attributable as well to the effect of short term feedback. Bed 
capacity at many hospitals is tight because of growth strategies adopted in 
response to cost containment pressures, which has also led to efforts to control 
inventory and staffing.(Bellandi and Rauber 1999) This environment provides a 
perceptual filter that shapes a growth in utilization as a reduction in profitability. 
These results support findings from other studies. Problems with 
preparedness planning and implementation are not unique to Indiana, as the well-
known problems at the local, state, and federal levels in Louisiana during the 
Hurricane Katarina catastrophe revealed. Higgins and colleagues, using the Mass 
Casualty Disaster Plan checklist, found in 2002 that hospital preparedness in 
Kentucky was clearly undeveloped and in the early stage of planning, with 
planning more developed in those counties participating in the Metropolitan 
Medical Response System (MMRS) program.(Higgins et al. 2004) This reflects 
the situation we observed. While planners, for the most part, were committing a 
significant effort in trying to develop a pandemic influenza plan, and in fact had 
made large strides over the previous year, the plans developed were still crude and 
required much more work. The few study counties that were participants in the 
MMRS program, as in Kentucky, had more experience in disaster planning, more 
resources to commit to preparedness efforts, and were further along in their 
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efforts. Likewise, the problems of coordination, oversight, and shared procedures, 
while disturbing, are no different than those experienced in Ontario during the 
2002 SARS epidemic(Cameron, Schull, and Cooke 2006), Arkansas in applying 
bioterrorism preparedness protocols to a recent pertussis outbreak(Wheeler et al. 
2004), or those reported in other studies of emergency preparedness, where 
similar trends in improved planning are also seen.(Braun et al. 2006; Braun et al. 
2004) This study found smaller, more rural areas less prepared and less capable of 
responding to a pandemic, likewise similar to other findings.(Manley et al. 2006) 
This project began with the goal of developing a planning template for the 
use of alternate, non-hospital care sites to expand hospital surge capacity. Lam 
and colleagues, examining pandemic response strategies from all 50 of the United 
States as well as several foreign governments, found that the idea of the 
alternative care site was widespread, but rarely articulated how these sites would 
play a role in the community response or whether they would even be 
feasible.(Lam et al. 2006) From in-depth interviews with community emergency 
planners, our team derives similar conclusions. Significant barriers exist to the use 
of alternative care sites for building hospital surge capacity, and any attempt to 
develop such capacity should focus on how alternative care arrangements fit into 
the overall local emergency management and healthcare systems.  More important 
than an alternative care site is the strategy for an alternative care system. 
These findings suggest several lessons for improving the ability of the 
public health and healthcare systems to build emergency response capacity, all of 
which arose during the interviews with the county planners. The first is that 
building surge capacity requires coordination between public health, emergency 
management, and health care professionals at a local level and in recognition of 
local factors. A corollary to this point is that the definition of “local” may not 
correspond to the political definitions as understood at state and federal levels. In 
the case of building surge capacity, health care service areas do not conveniently 
match local political jurisdictions, meaning that effective “local” planning might 
be better done at a regional level. In addition, mutual aid, which is built into the 
planning assumptions connected with location-limited, geographically-focused 
public health emergencies, isn’t as relevant to pandemic flu planning, which by 
definition involves a large, widespread impact. As a result, planning efforts run 
into coordination barriers resulting from a cognitive mismatch between planning 
jurisdictions and implementation networks. 
The second lesson is that all-hazards preparedness may require different 
plans to build surge capacity for different scenarios. Acute, localized events pose 
different requirements for surge capacity and different resource constraints than 
extended or widespread problems. As Foreman notes, “The more durable a threat 
is, the more likely it is to acquire policy complications.”(Foreman 1994) External 
assistance (such as deployment of the Federal Medical Station hospital 
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augmentation units) may be available during a localized event, but not during a 
pandemic. A mass shooting incident such as took place at Virginia Tech, on the 
other hand, may present fewer but more complex cases requiring immediate 
intensive treatment, where an influenza pandemic would require less intensive 
supportive care for more patients over a longer time period. Each presents 
different challenges, and requires different solutions. A one-size-fits-all plan will 
not reflect these constraints.  
A third lesson is that legal and institutional barriers may constrain 
planning in ways not immediately evident, and that planners may not have the 
authority or power to address these problems. Issues such as insurance 
reimbursement, malpractice and liability insurance, and scope of practice rules 
constrain the potential solution set for local planners, and require policy action at 
a state or federal level to solve. Likewise, legal and logistical issues related to 
enforced isolation are complex and may be outside the scope of authority of local 
planners. As a result, higher level planners (state and federal) need to develop 
mechanisms to gather information from planners regarding potential barriers and 
build a policy-making capacity to address these barriers before a disaster occurs. 
A final lesson is that planners need to more explicitly and actively 
challenge their assumptions about emergency response capabilities and 
conditions, because the characteristics of some emergencies force planners and 
responders to perform tasks far outside of their traditional cognitive framework. 
That framework is reinforced because it reflects the normal environment the 
planners experience and is rewarded under normal conditions. Emergencies, 
however, are not normal events, and successful strategies under ordinary 
conditions are unlikely to be appropriate for managing under extraordinary 
circumstances. Reconciling the two is perhaps the biggest challenge for 
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